connect-tool
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches script templates and additional markdown instructions from the author's repository at
github.com/Melvynx/ai-maxxing-skills. These resources are used to scaffold new tools. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes system-level package managers including
brew,npm,pipx, anduvto install official vendor CLIs as requested by the user. It also uses shell commands to verify installations and configure paths. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Programmatically generates new Python scripts and markdown skill definitions (
SKILL.md) at runtime, writing them to the user's home directory to create functional, persistent agent extensions. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions include steps for using
sudowhen necessary for global package installations, though the skill explicitly directs the agent to obtain user confirmation first. - [PERSISTENCE]: Modifies local system configuration by creating symbolic links in
~/.claude/skillsand instructing the user to add environment variables to their~/.zshrcfile to ensure generated tools remain available across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: A vulnerability surface exists because the skill processes external API documentation (provided via URL or text) to generate CLI code and agent instructions.
- Ingestion points: External API documentation and URLs processed during Step 3b.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are applied when reading external documentation.
- Capability inventory: High-privilege actions including tool installation (subprocesses), file system writes, and symlink creation are available after data ingestion.
- Sanitization: The instructions attempt to mitigate risk by requiring the agent to use only "confirmed endpoints" and relying on a pre-defined script template.
Audit Metadata