video-setup
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to modify the
.claude/settings.json(orsettings.local.json) file to pre-approve various shell commands, includingyt-dlp,ffmpeg, andffprobe. This deliberately bypasses the platform's security architecture that requires human-in-the-loop confirmation for tool execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs remote code execution by downloading and piping shell scripts directly to the shell (
curl ... | sh). These patterns are used for installing Deno (viadeno.land) and the Treg CLI (viatreg.to). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an ingestion pipeline that fetches transcripts from external URLs (YouTube, TikTok, Instagram) using
yt-dlp. This untrusted external content is then used to construct thevoice.mdfile, which serves as a core instruction set for subsequent video editing and scriptwriting tasks. - Ingestion points: External URLs provided by the user for video transcripts (SKILL.md, Section 4).
- Boundary markers: The skill suggests reading the generated
voice.mdback to the user for validation, which provides a manual check but doesn't programmatically sanitize the input. - Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system writes, network access via
yt-dlpandcurl, and shell command execution (ffmpeg,node). - Sanitization: There is no automated sanitization of the transcript content before it is interpolated into the
voice.mdtemplate. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform system checks, install software, and manage files. It specifically requests pre-approval for these commands to run autonomously in future sessions.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://deno.land/install.sh, https://treg.to/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata