oracle-taleo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@membranehq/clipackage globally using NPM. This is the official command-line tool provided by the vendor for managing integrations and authentication. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell commands via the
membraneCLI to perform login, create connections, and execute actions. Commands likemembrane action createandmembrane action runinterpolate natural language descriptions or JSON parameters into command arguments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from Oracle Taleo (such as candidate records or job requisitions) which is attacker-controllable if an external party modifies those records.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
membrane action listand the results ofmembrane action runare provided back to the agent context. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (via the Membrane CLI) and modify remote data through actions.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the data returned from the external API before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata