integration-development

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The documentation describes features that ingest natural language "intents" to dynamically generate integration connectors and actions. This identifies a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where crafted input could attempt to influence the agent's generation process.\n
  • Ingestion points: The intent parameter documented in the connect and action create tools within SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly describe boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings for the intent processing phase.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill documents extensive platform capabilities, including performing network operations, executing JavaScript in a sandbox, and managing workspace settings (SKILL.md).\n
  • Sanitization: Instructions for sanitizing or validating user-provided intent strings are not included in the skill content.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and downloads tools and libraries from the vendor's official repositories and well-known registries.\n
  • Fetches the CLI tool using npx @membranehq/cli.\n
  • Imports the SDK via the https://esm.sh/@membranehq/sdk CDN.\n
  • Dependencies include the vendor's packages (@membranehq/sdk, @membranehq/react) and the standard jsonwebtoken library.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous examples of using the vendor's membrane CLI to manage credentials, list connections, and execute actions, which are central to its documented purpose.\n
  • Commands include membrane credentials, membrane act, and membrane action create.\n
  • Mentions session storage in ~/.membrane/credentials.json as part of standard CLI authentication flow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:09 AM