integration-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The documentation describes features that ingest natural language "intents" to dynamically generate integration connectors and actions. This identifies a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where crafted input could attempt to influence the agent's generation process.\n
- Ingestion points: The
intentparameter documented in theconnectandaction createtools within SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly describe boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings for the intent processing phase.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill documents extensive platform capabilities, including performing network operations, executing JavaScript in a sandbox, and managing workspace settings (SKILL.md).\n
- Sanitization: Instructions for sanitizing or validating user-provided intent strings are not included in the skill content.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and downloads tools and libraries from the vendor's official repositories and well-known registries.\n
- Fetches the CLI tool using
npx @membranehq/cli.\n - Imports the SDK via the
https://esm.sh/@membranehq/sdkCDN.\n - Dependencies include the vendor's packages (
@membranehq/sdk,@membranehq/react) and the standardjsonwebtokenlibrary.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous examples of using the vendor'smembraneCLI to manage credentials, list connections, and execute actions, which are central to its documented purpose.\n - Commands include
membrane credentials,membrane act, andmembrane action create.\n - Mentions session storage in
~/.membrane/credentials.jsonas part of standard CLI authentication flow.
Audit Metadata