motion-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses directive language to override default agent behavior and maximize autonomy.
- Evidence: "Freedom Level: Maximum" and "You don't ask — you analyze... specify animation details, create motion specs, generate code, and produce delivery-ready output" (SKILL.md). These instructions encourage the agent to bypass user confirmation and take autonomous actions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to the ingestion of untrusted external data combined with code generation capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads design data via
get_design_context,figma_take_screenshot, andfigma_get_variables(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are specified for the ingested design context.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates and prepares for the execution of React/Remotion code and shell commands like
npx remotion studio(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested design metadata is described before it is interpolated into code generation tasks.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the use of external tools and packages from public registries.
- Evidence: Mentions
npx remotion studio, Framer Motion, GSAP, and Lottie (SKILL.md). These involve downloading and executing code from the NPM registry. - Metadata: The
note.jsonfile references a GitHub repository athttps://github.com/sarveshsea/memi. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to prepare and run shell commands for rendering and studio environments.
- Evidence: References to
npx remotion studioand render command preparation (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata