aep-build
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: During the initialization phase (Phase 0), the skill executes a script located at
.claude/hooks/workspace-setup.shusingbash. Since this script resides within the repository being processed, its contents are not controlled by the skill and could execute arbitrary code in the agent's environment.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a recovery shell script at.dev-workflow/init.shusing templates and executes it. This practice of generating and running executable code at runtime increases the attack surface.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources to guide its autonomous behavior. \n - Ingestion points: The agent reads
tasks.md,specs/*.md,design.md,proposal.md, and feedback signals from.dev-workflow/signals/feedback.md. It also retrieves PR comments and CI feedback via theghandglabCLI tools.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters mentioned to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions embedded within these external documents.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands, perform git operations (commit, push, rebase, merge), and interact with remote repository hosts (GitHub/GitLab).\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is described before it is used to influence the agent's task implementation or decision-making.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill uses
chmod +xto modify permissions on the generated.dev-workflow/init.shscript, granting it execution privileges within the workspace.
Audit Metadata