aep-watch

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external, untrusted sources including bug trackers and error streams, creating a surface for potential prompt injection attacks via the ingested content.
  • Ingestion points: External API endpoints and file globs defined in topology.routing.watch.sources and telemetry_sources.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands within the ingested data during the classification step.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to update product-context.yaml and commit changes to the repository, which directly influences the behavior of downstream automated agents.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented logic for sanitizing or escaping the content fetched from external sources before it is interpreted or stored.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The instructions describe how to implement a continuous 'watch loop' by configuring system-level scheduling utilities such as cron jobs or macOS launchd services to ensure the skill executes at regular intervals.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands for workspace management and validation, including git for repository synchronization and npx for running YAML validation utilities (js-yaml, tsx).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated network requests using curl to retrieve telemetry findings from remote endpoints as part of its primary ingestion workflow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 11:02 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — aep-watch