aep-watch
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external, untrusted sources including bug trackers and error streams, creating a surface for potential prompt injection attacks via the ingested content.
- Ingestion points: External API endpoints and file globs defined in
topology.routing.watch.sourcesandtelemetry_sources. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands within the ingested data during the classification step.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to update
product-context.yamland commit changes to the repository, which directly influences the behavior of downstream automated agents. - Sanitization: There is no documented logic for sanitizing or escaping the content fetched from external sources before it is interpreted or stored.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The instructions describe how to implement a continuous 'watch loop' by configuring system-level scheduling utilities such as
cronjobs or macOSlaunchdservices to ensure the skill executes at regular intervals. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands for workspace management and validation, including
gitfor repository synchronization andnpxfor running YAML validation utilities (js-yaml,tsx). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated network requests using
curlto retrieve telemetry findings from remote endpoints as part of its primary ingestion workflow.
Audit Metadata