memos-memory

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the memos CLI tool to perform all operations, executing subcommands such as search, add, extract, chat, and kb to manage memory and documents.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The uninstallation routine described in references/memos-uninstall.md includes a --path flag that modifies shell configuration files (~/.bash_profile and ~/.zshenv) to remove MemOS-managed PATH entries. While this is an environment modification pattern, it is presented here as a cleanup mechanism during a user-initiated uninstallation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the capture of user and assistant messages for long-term storage and later retrieval into the agent's context. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are persisted in the memory database.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history captured in references/memos-add.md.
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined to separate retrieved memory context from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has extensive shell execution capabilities via the memos CLI across all operational files.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation of the text content before it is stored or after it is retrieved.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 30, 2026, 02:54 PM