memos-memory-guide
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple sources including past conversation history, team-shared memories, and external skills discovered via search tools.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves data through
memory_search,memory_get,skill_get, andnetwork_memory_detail(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate retrieved memory content from the agent's control instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to write to shared memory (
memory_write_public), install new skills (skill_install), and communicate with a team server. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for content retrieved from the memory database or team hub.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
better-sqlite3Node.js package and provides tools to pull skill bundles from a remote team server. - Evidence: The metadata specifies
kind: node,package: better-sqlite3for installation. The toolnetwork_skill_pullis designed to download content from a remote server. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
skill_installtool allows the agent to load and permanently enable new capabilities in its workspace, which involves the dynamic loading of instructions or executable logic. - Evidence: The instruction for
skill_installstates it installs a skill so it "becomes permanently available" and will be "loaded automatically in future sessions." - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to transmit local conversation data and tasks to a remote hub or team server.
- Evidence: Tools like
memory_share,task_share, andskill_publishsupport atarget='hub'parameter to send data externally. While the instructions mandate explicit user consent, the functional capability for data transmission is present.
Audit Metadata