workflow-progress-screenshots
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/capture.mjsscript uses the Chrome DevTools ProtocolRuntime.evaluatemethod to execute JavaScript strings within the browser context. These strings are derived from command-line arguments and environment variables.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Thescripts/capture.mjsscript contains a JavaScript injection vulnerability where theWAIT_FORenvironment variable is directly interpolated into an evaluation string:evaluate(`(()=>{try{return !!(${process.env.WAIT_FOR})}catch{return false}})()`). This lacks proper sanitization, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the browser if they can influence the agent's environment.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By allowing the agent to capture screenshots of any URL and send them to the user, the skill creates a path for data exfiltration. An agent could be directed to capture sensitive internal pages, local system files, or authentication-heavy views, resulting in the unauthorized export of sensitive data as images.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant surface for indirect prompt injection as it instructions the agent to visit external websites and analyze the resulting images and console logs.\n - Ingestion points: External URLs visited by
scripts/capture.mjsand the console errors printed to the agent's context.\n - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt instructions to distinguish between trusted instructions and external page content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to spawn processes, write to the filesystem, and perform network navigation via a headless browser.\n
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external URLs before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata