nested-subagents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents and promotes a nested agent architecture using the platform's
Tasktool, creating a multi-layered vulnerability surface where instructions can be passed deep into a tree of agents. - Ingestion points: Child agents are spawned with a
promptfield containing a<problem statement>(referenced in SKILL.md steps 1 and 3), which typically originates from user input or external data sources. - Boundary markers: The provided implementation examples do not utilize boundary markers or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the delegated problem statements.
- Capability inventory: Agents within the tree have access to powerful tools including
Bash(shell command execution),Task(recursive agent spawning), andTodoWrite(file system modification). - Sanitization: The skill does not provide or recommend any sanitization, filtering, or validation logic for the content passed from the root coordinator to child sub-agents.
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