mergify-merge-queue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted sources including GitHub pull request comments, check run outputs, and API logs. This creates a potential attack surface where malicious actors could embed instructions within these fields to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to read pull request comments using
gh api .../comments, check run titles and summaries viagh api .../check-runs, and Mergify activity logs usingcurl. These sources are populated by user comments and external CI provider outputs. - Boundary markers: There are no specific boundary markers or instructions provided to the agent to treat this ingested content as data rather than instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
mergifyCLI, theghCLI for repository interaction, andcurlfor making network requests toapi.mergify.com(a vendor-owned domain). - Sanitization: The instructions do not include any logic for sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from these external sources before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata