meshy-openclaw
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill retrieves the
MESHY_API_KEYfrom the system environment or a local.envfile in the current working directory. This key is used exclusively to authenticate HTTP requests to the official Meshy AI API endpoints (api.meshy.ai). This is a standard implementation for API-driven tools and does not involve exfiltration of unauthorized data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/slicers.pyscript employs thesubprocessmodule to open generated 3D models in external slicing software such as OrcaSlicer or Bambu Studio. The implementation uses argument lists rather than shell strings, which mitigates common command injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads 3D assets (GLB, OBJ, 3MF) and associated thumbnails from
meshy.aidomains. These downloads are initiated by user generation requests and are stored within a structured localmeshy_output/directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided text prompts and external image URLs to generate 3D content. While this presents a surface for indirect prompt injection (where malicious data could be embedded in external assets or prompts), the skill includes mandatory human-in-the-loop confirmation steps for credit consumption and primarily processes binary model data, which reduces the risk of autonomous agent exploitation.
- Ingestion points: User prompts via
meshy_task.pyand image URLs inpipelines.md. - Boundary markers: Explicit requirement to present cost summaries and await user confirmation before task creation.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution in
slicers.py, network requests viarequests, and local file system writes inmeshy_task.py. - Sanitization: Input prompts are limited in length (600 chars), and file system paths are sanitized using regex-based slugification.
Audit Metadata