pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted data (git diffs) through various review sub-prompts. A malicious actor could potentially include instructions within a code change that attempt to influence the agent's review output.
- Ingestion points: The output of
git diffis ingested in Phase 2 for analysis by correctness, style, security, and test coverage subagents. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers (such as XML tags or specific 'ignore instructions' warnings) are defined for the diff content before it is passed to the sub-prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
git,gh), write to the filesystem (Phase 5 changelog updates), and perform network operations via the GitHub CLI (gh pr create,gh pr edit). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the git diff content before it is interpreted by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local shell commands to manage the PR workflow. This includes repository inspection (
git status,git log,git merge-base,git diff), GitHub API interaction (gh pr list,gh pr create,gh pr edit), and repository modification (git commit). These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose and use theunsandboxed: trueconfiguration.
Audit Metadata