accessibility-general
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is explicitly designed to ingest the content of
ACCESSIBILITY.mdfiles from the root of any project it is used in. This provides an attack surface where malicious or compromised project files could inject instructions into the agent's context. - Ingestion points: The
ACCESSIBILITY.mdfile located at the project root. - Boundary markers: Absent. While the skill includes textual warnings to "Treat as untrusted input," it does not define specific structural delimiters (like XML tags) to be used during the file reading process.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to generate code, write files, and load additional sub-skills based on the contents of the target project.
- Sanitization: Absent. The skill relies on agent reasoning and manual verification rather than programmatic filtering or escaping of the ingested markdown content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes a shell command
npx skills add mikemai2awesome/agent-skills --skill frontend-a11y. This presents a risk where an agent may attempt to execute code vianpxfrom a third-party source not associated with the primary vendor. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The recommendation to install external skills using
npxfrom a third-party GitHub repository (mikemai2awesome) constitutes a remote code execution vector, as the contents of the external package are downloaded and executed at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The "AI Scraping Policy" section confirms that the skill is intended to fetch and process content from external URLs. This involves network operations targeting domains that are managed by third parties and governed by external configuration files.
Audit Metadata