git-create-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository's environment which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during PR generation.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from
git log,git diff, local branch names, and.github/pull_request_template.md(all of which are user/attacker-controlled if the repository is untrusted). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or XML-style tags are used when interpolating this data into the prompt for PR title and body generation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute
git pushandgh pr createvia theBashtool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from git logs or diffs before it is used to generate the PR content.
- Mitigation: The skill includes a mandatory user confirmation step (
Ask for confirmation) where the agent previews the generated title and body before performing any network operations. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates a temporary markdown file at runtime to facilitate the pull request creation process.
- Evidence: In step 5, it writes a PR body to a temporary path:
BODY_FILE="/tmp/pr-body-$(date +%s).md". This file is then used as an argument for thegh pr create --body-filecommand in step 7. While this is standard practice for PR automation, generating and referencing local files is a form of dynamic content creation.
Audit Metadata