motion-studio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the installation of external agent skills and plugins. It fetches configuration and components from well-known services such as
heygen-com/hyperframesandremotion-dev/skills. However, it also instructs the user to install thebuildwithhanif/claude-animation-skillfrom a third-party community repository via the marketplace. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands to perform its core functions, including
ffmpegfor video encoding and subframe blending,nodeandnpxfor executing rendering scripts and installing dependencies, andpythonfor audio processing and beat detection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns for the agent to ingest data from untrusted external sources, specifically by visiting product URLs to capture screenshots and analyze brand identity.
- Ingestion points: External product websites processed via Playwright to extract screenshots, logos, and style information as described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/prompting-and-briefs.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the retrieved web content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions that might be present in the target site's DOM or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to write files to the local system, perform network operations, and execute shell commands (
ffmpeg,node,python). - Sanitization: The workflow does not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation steps for the data retrieved from external URLs before it is used to influence the code generation or animation parameters.
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