jira-daily
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads from
~/.config/.jira/.config.ymlto extract the Jira project key. Accessing configuration files in the user's home directory is a sensitive file path access. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell commands are used to interact with
jira-cliandgit. Examples includejira issue listandgit log, which are executed to gather work activity metrics. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation refers to an external repository (
github.com/ankitpokhrel/jira-cli) as a required dependency for the skill's functionality. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via Jira ticket summaries, descriptions, and git commit messages processed during the gathering phase.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted data from the agent's core prompts when being analyzed by sub-agents in Phase 4.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
catfor file reading and executes shell commands via thejiraandgitcommand-line tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the content retrieved from Jira or Git before it is interpolated into prompts for analysis.
Audit Metadata