drupalorg-issue-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
php drupalorgandgitCLI tools to perform operations. Several instructions involve passing raw user input or derived strings directly into shell commands without explicit sanitization or escaping. - The
queryparameter from the user is passed directly tophp drupalorg issue:search <query>. - The
projectmachine name, which can be provided via flags or inferred from git configuration, is passed directly to shell commands. - An attacker could craft a malicious query (e.g., using semicolons or backticks) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
WebFetchfromdrupal.orgproject issue pages and from broader web search results in Step 3b and 3c. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or directions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched HTML or search results.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
php drupalorg issue:show <nid>) based on data extracted from these untrusted sources. - Sanitization: While Step 4 and 6 mention parsing 'numeric IDs' (NIDs), which provides a layer of validation for the
nidvariable, the titles and other metadata extracted from these external pages are used in the final summary and could influence agent behavior if they contain malicious instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata