forge-land
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process untrusted data from external sources, which creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads pull request bodies using
gh pr view --json body, as well as code diffs and specific file contents viagit diffandgit show. These inputs are directly controlled by the pull request author or contributors. - Boundary markers: The risk assessment is delegated to a 'fresh-context sub-agent'. While this provides a layer of isolation for the session context, the prompt provided to the sub-agent does not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested PR content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities, most notably the ability to merge code into the base branch using
gh pr merge --autoand to modify pull request metadata viagh pr edit. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is applied to the PR body or code diffs before they are interpolated into the prompt for the risk-judging sub-agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various GitHub CLI (
gh) andgitcommands. While these are essential for the skill's purpose, the automated execution ofgh pr mergeis a high-privilege operation that depends on the output of an LLM-based risk assessment, making it a critical point of failure if the LLM's judgment is subverted.
Audit Metadata