skills/mgratzer/forge/forge-land/Gen Agent Trust Hub

forge-land

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process untrusted data from external sources, which creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads pull request bodies using gh pr view --json body, as well as code diffs and specific file contents via git diff and git show. These inputs are directly controlled by the pull request author or contributors.
  • Boundary markers: The risk assessment is delegated to a 'fresh-context sub-agent'. While this provides a layer of isolation for the session context, the prompt provided to the sub-agent does not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested PR content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities, most notably the ability to merge code into the base branch using gh pr merge --auto and to modify pull request metadata via gh pr edit.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is applied to the PR body or code diffs before they are interpolated into the prompt for the risk-judging sub-agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various GitHub CLI (gh) and git commands. While these are essential for the skill's purpose, the automated execution of gh pr merge is a high-privilege operation that depends on the output of an LLM-based risk assessment, making it a critical point of failure if the LLM's judgment is subverted.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 08:16 PM