policy-interpretation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/search.pyusessubprocess.runto execute a local sibling script (web-fetch/scripts/fetch.py) via theuvtool. It passes URL data retrieved from ministry metadata as command-line arguments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile provides instructions for the agent to execute a shell command (find / -name departments.py ...) to locate the skill's base directory on the host system if the environment path is not predefined. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network requests through its helper script to fetch policy documents and metadata from multiple official Chinese government domains, including
ndrc.gov.cn,miit.gov.cn,mem.gov.cn, and the State Council's policy library. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and interprets external HTML and PDF content from policy sites without sanitizing the text for embedded instructions.
- Ingestion points: External policy text and attachment contents fetched in
SKILL.mdStep 3 and processed byscripts/search.py. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the fetched policy documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute local shell commands and Python scripts via
subprocessand perform network operations. - Sanitization: Employs basic HTML tag stripping (
strip_tags) inscripts/search.py, but lacks filtering for natural language instructions in the final text provided to the agent for interpretation.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: unknown (check file) - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata