ralph-wiggum
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a dynamic context injection pattern in
SKILL.mdto executePLUGIN_ROOT/scripts/setup-ralph-loop.shusing$ARGUMENTS. This allows unsanitized user input to flow directly into a shell execution context during the skill initialization phase, creating a command injection vulnerability. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/stop-hook.shscript programmatically accesses the full session transcript file ($TRANSCRIPT_PATH) to monitor assistant messages. This constitutes access to sensitive session data, including previous user inputs and model responses, which is a significant privacy and security concern if the data were to be exfiltrated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions that attempt to override the agent's standard behavior and exit protocols. It commands the agent to use a 'self-blocking exit pattern' and 'not output false promises to escape the loop,' effectively trapping the agent in an autonomous feedback loop that ignores standard termination signals. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The iterative loop mechanism functions by storing user-provided prompt text in a local state file and re-injecting it into the agent's context via the stop hook's
reasonfield. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where instructions in the original prompt are repeatedly applied to the session without standard boundary markers or sanitization.
Audit Metadata