writing-rules

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a system that processes untrusted data streams to generate instructions for the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Matches patterns against bash tool commands, file edit contents (new_text, old_text), and user_prompt data.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation does not describe the use of delimiters or isolation protocols for triggered rule messages.
  • Capability inventory: The skill documents a multi-step chain where rule output (markdown messages) directly influences the agent's subsequent tool usage and logic.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or safety validation for rule messages or matched input is mentioned.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation suggests executing shell commands locally to verify regular expression patterns.
  • Evidence: Provides a python one-liner for testing: python3 -c "import re; print(re.search(r'your_pattern', 'test text'))".
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill identifies and lists multiple sensitive file paths as recommended targets for security monitoring rules.
  • Evidence: Mentions sensitive files such as .env, credentials, .pem, and ~/.aws/credentials.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill facilitates the creation of persistent configuration files that influence agent behavior across sessions.
  • Evidence: Rules are stored in the .agent/ directory as .local.md files and are loaded dynamically whenever a tool is invoked.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 01:19 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — writing-rules