writing-rules
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a system that processes untrusted data streams to generate instructions for the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Matches patterns against
bashtool commands,fileedit contents (new_text,old_text), anduser_promptdata. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not describe the use of delimiters or isolation protocols for triggered rule messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill documents a multi-step chain where rule output (markdown messages) directly influences the agent's subsequent tool usage and logic.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or safety validation for rule messages or matched input is mentioned.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation suggests executing shell commands locally to verify regular expression patterns.
- Evidence: Provides a python one-liner for testing:
python3 -c "import re; print(re.search(r'your_pattern', 'test text'))". - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill identifies and lists multiple sensitive file paths as recommended targets for security monitoring rules.
- Evidence: Mentions sensitive files such as
.env,credentials,.pem, and~/.aws/credentials. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill facilitates the creation of persistent configuration files that influence agent behavior across sessions.
- Evidence: Rules are stored in the
.agent/directory as.local.mdfiles and are loaded dynamically whenever a tool is invoked.
Audit Metadata