rapid-mastery-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process significant amounts of untrusted data, providing a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill takes input for "project ideas" (Step 1) and "external feedback" (Milestones M3 and M6) from sources like WeChat, Reddit, or other user-provided content.
- Boundary markers: The prompt templates and instructions do not include clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to separate user-provided data from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Read,Write, andEdittools, which could be misused if injected instructions are followed. - Sanitization: There is no explicit instruction to sanitize or validate the content of external feedback or project ideas before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform file system operations for state persistence. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to use shell commands such ascat > .rmf-state.jsonto write hidden state files andcat .rmf-state.jsonto read them. - Context: While this is the intended mechanism for cross-session persistence, using a powerful tool like
Bashto write to user-specified paths introduces a risk if the agent's behavior is influenced by malicious input.
Audit Metadata