rapid-mastery-orchestrator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process significant amounts of untrusted data, providing a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill takes input for "project ideas" (Step 1) and "external feedback" (Milestones M3 and M6) from sources like WeChat, Reddit, or other user-provided content.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates and instructions do not include clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to separate user-provided data from the agent's logic.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, Read, Write, and Edit tools, which could be misused if injected instructions are followed.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit instruction to sanitize or validate the content of external feedback or project ideas before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform file system operations for state persistence.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to use shell commands such as cat > .rmf-state.json to write hidden state files and cat .rmf-state.json to read them.
  • Context: While this is the intended mechanism for cross-session persistence, using a powerful tool like Bash to write to user-specified paths introduces a risk if the agent's behavior is influenced by malicious input.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 26, 2026, 02:06 AM