brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from multiple sources without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 (Initial user ideas), Phase 2 (User responses to Socratic questions), and Phase 3 (Results from the
web-search-researchersubagent) are all interpolated into the agent's context inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters (e.g., XML tags, triple backticks) or specific instructions to the agent to disregard embedded commands within these inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the
docs/brainstorms/directory (Phase 5) and perform deep codebase analysis using thecodebase-locator,codebase-analyzer, andcodebase-pattern-findersubagents (Phase 3). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for the data retrieved from web searches or provided by the user.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly instructs subagents in Phase 3 to locate and analyze "Configuration and setup files" and "Integration points" within the codebase.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.mdunder Phase 3, thecodebase-locatoris prompted to find "Configuration and setup files" and thecodebase-analyzeris tasked to "Trace the data flow and identify integration points... include file:line references." - Risk: While intended for architectural brainstorming, these instructions provide a mechanism for the agent to inadvertently include sensitive configuration details (such as environment variable names, internal paths, or architectural secrets) in the final brainstorming document written to the
docs/folder.
Audit Metadata