interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted code diffs and file contents which are interpolated into reviewer prompts. This creates an attack surface where code being reviewed could attempt to influence the LLM reviewers.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Step 1) gathers diffs and file contents from the repository context. - Boundary markers:
references/reviewer-prompt.mduses markdown headers to separate code content, but lacks specific escaping or structured delimiters for the code block. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Agenttool to spawn subagents andgit difffor local file access. Subagents are explicitly set toreadonly: trueinSKILL.md(Step 3), which prevents them from making changes to the environment. - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the ingested code content.
- [SAFE]: The skill utilizes security best practices by enforcing
readonlymode on spawned subagents and provides a structured Synthesis and Judgment framework inreferences/lead-judgment.mdto help the lead reviewer filter potential noise, hallucinations, or biased outputs resulting from the review process.
Audit Metadata