parallel-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture involves ingesting untrusted external data which is then used to prompt sub-agents with high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts external file paths, descriptions, and reference files as inputs in Step 0.
- Boundary markers: Step 5's prompt template does not utilize boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions to isolate ingested content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The system grants sub-agents full access to tools including 'Read', 'Write', and 'Shell' as described in the 'Agents' section.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety-filtering for the plan inputs before they are interpolated into the sub-agent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the shell to perform project-level verification tasks.
- Evidence: Step 6.3 specifies the execution of
npm runscripts for type checking, linting, and testing, which grants the agent the ability to execute code defined within the project environment.
Audit Metadata