before-and-after
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to upload captured screenshots to external services. It accepts
file://URLs, allowing it to access and screenshot local system files, which are then uploaded to0x0.st, a public, anonymous, and unauthenticated file-hosting service. This behavior poses a significant risk of exposing proprietary UI designs or sensitive local file contents to the public internet. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdstates the tool "Accepts two URLs (file://, http://, https://)". - Evidence:
scripts/adapters/0x0st.shusescurlto send files tohttps://0x0.st. - Evidence:
SKILL.mddocuments0x0.stas the default hosting provider. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
upload-and-copy.shscript dynamically determines which adapter script to execute based on theIMAGE_ADAPTERenvironment variable. This allows the execution of different shell scripts within thescripts/adapters/directory based on runtime configuration. - Evidence:
scripts/upload-and-copy.shexecutes"$ADAPTER_SCRIPT" "$file"where the script path is derived from an environment variable. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several sensitive operations using command-line tools, including environment inspection and project modification.
- Evidence: Uses
gh pr editto modify the content of Pull Request descriptions. - Evidence: Uses
vercel inspectto retrieve bypass tokens for protected Vercel deployments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation and execution of external software from the NPM registry.
- Evidence:
allowed-toolsincludesnpm install -g @vercel/before-and-afterandnpx @vercel/before-and-afterfor obtaining the comparison utility from a well-known service. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external URLs and images and uses the resulting data to modify Pull Request bodies via the GitHub CLI. This creates a potential surface where malformed data processed during the screenshotting or uploading phase could influence the content of a PR modification.
- Ingestion points: User-provided URLs and image paths in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt interpolation process.
- Capability inventory:
gh pr edit,Bashexecution, and file system writes. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the generated markdown content before applying it to the PR.
Audit Metadata