greploop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core loop involves reading and acting upon feedback provided in PR/MR comments, issues, and changelist descriptions. Since this content can be provided by external users or influenced by contributors, it serves as an injection surface where malicious instructions could be embedded to trick the agent into performing unauthorized code changes during the 'fix' phase.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches review summaries and inline comments via
scripts/github_review.py(GitHub),references/gitlab-api.md(GitLab), andreferences/perforce.md(Perforce). - Boundary markers: Although the instructions advise verifying the trusted author login of the bot, there are no instructions to use delimiters or sanitization logic to separate the feedback content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to modify the worktree, run local checks, and push/shelve changes to the repository, providing a high-impact path for successful injections.
- Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the feedback strings before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes external CLI tools including
gh,glab, andp4to manage repository state and triggers. It also runs a bundled Python script (scripts/github_review.py) that usessubprocess.runto interact with the GitHub API. These tools are used for their intended purpose but constitute a broad interface for command execution.
Audit Metadata