build-contact-book

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted content from the web via its crawling scripts.
    • Ingestion points: The scripts/fetch_web.py script downloads and parses HTML content from arbitrary external domains provided in an input list.
    • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings applied to the data before it is stored in the contacts.db database or exported to JSONL/CSV files.
    • Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities for network access (crawling) and local file system modifications (database writes and file appends).
    • Sanitization: While scripts/name_filter.py provides validation for name formatting and length, it does not perform security-focused sanitization to detect or neutralize malicious prompt injection payloads embedded in web text or attributes.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated network operations to retrieve content from external websites.
    • Evidence: The script scripts/fetch_web.py uses urllib.request to fetch HTML data from domains for the purpose of extracting contact information and roles.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the user to execute shell commands to operate the skill's functionality.
    • Evidence: SKILL.md directs the user to run scripts using commands such as python3 <skill-dir>/scripts/init_contact_book.py leads/<slug>/contacts.db and python3 fetch_web.py domains.txt out.jsonl.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 05:13 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — build-contact-book