build-contact-book
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted content from the web via its crawling scripts.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/fetch_web.pyscript downloads and parses HTML content from arbitrary external domains provided in an input list. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings applied to the data before it is stored in the
contacts.dbdatabase or exported to JSONL/CSV files. - Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities for network access (crawling) and local file system modifications (database writes and file appends).
- Sanitization: While
scripts/name_filter.pyprovides validation for name formatting and length, it does not perform security-focused sanitization to detect or neutralize malicious prompt injection payloads embedded in web text or attributes.
- Ingestion points: The
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated network operations to retrieve content from external websites.
- Evidence: The script
scripts/fetch_web.pyusesurllib.requestto fetch HTML data from domains for the purpose of extracting contact information and roles.
- Evidence: The script
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the user to execute shell commands to operate the skill's functionality.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the user to run scripts using commands such aspython3 <skill-dir>/scripts/init_contact_book.py leads/<slug>/contacts.dbandpython3 fetch_web.py domains.txt out.jsonl.
- Evidence:
Audit Metadata