skills/michaeltarasov02/skills/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py contains logic to write C source code to a temporary file, compile it into a shared object (.so) using gcc, and then inject that object into the soffice process execution using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. This pattern is highly characteristic of process-injection attacks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts execute arbitrary system commands via subprocess.run, including scripts/office/soffice.py (which invokes gcc and soffice), scripts/accept_changes.py (which invokes soffice), and scripts/office/validators/redlining.py (which invokes git diff).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted document data is ingested through scripts/office/unpack.py and scripts/office/validate.py.
  • Boundary markers: None. No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing pipeline.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including file writing and arbitrary command execution through soffice and gcc as defined in scripts/office/soffice.py.
  • Sanitization: The skill employs defusedxml for XML parsing, which provides protection against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, but does not sanitize natural language content that may influence agent logic.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 10, 2026, 12:23 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — docx