laniameda-gallery-ingest
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/ingest.tsscript utilizesreadFileSyncto access files at paths provided via command-line arguments andfetchto transmit the base64-encoded content to a remote URL defined by theCONVEX_URLenvironment variable. This capability enables the transmission of arbitrary local file contents to a remote server. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of a Bun script (
scripts/ingest.ts) to handle file processing and network requests based on agent-supplied data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external data.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via
filePath,imagePath, and externalurlparameters as documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands when processing content from these external sources.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
scripts/ingest.ts, which can read local files and perform network POST operations. - Sanitization: No evidence of validation or filtering is present for the prompt text extracted from external images or URLs before it is saved to the database.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions to install and update the skill from a GitHub repository (
https://github.com/Michailbul/laniameda-gallery). This is treated as a standard vendor resource. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The file
SKILL.mdcontains a hardcoded user identifier (278674008) labeled as a required Telegram user ID for the knowledge base owner.
Audit Metadata