laniameda-gallery-ingest
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/ingest.tsscript enables the reading of arbitrary files from the agent's filesystem and transmits the data to a remote service. • Evidence: The script utilizesreadFileSyncto access the file path specified in thefilePathparameter of the JSON input. • Evidence: The ingested file contents are then sent to the configured Convex backend service using an HTTP POST request. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions that require the agent to download and run code from a remote GitHub repository. • Evidence: Documentation in
README.mdandSKILL.mddirects the agent to executegit pullfollowed bybun run skills:updatewithin thelaniameda.galleryrepository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted data while possessing file-read and network capabilities. • Ingestion points:
scripts/ingest.tsprocessesurlandpromptTextfields from potentially untrusted sources. • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore commands embedded within the ingested content. • Capability inventory: Thescripts/ingest.tsscript has filesystem access viareadFileSyncand network access via thefetchAPI. • Sanitization: Absent; the script does not perform validation or filtering on the provided file paths or ingested data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata