research-deep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external
outline.yamlandfields.yamlfiles and interpolates the content directly into prompts for sub-agents, creating a surface for instruction overrides. - Ingestion points: In Step 1, the skill reads an external
outline.yamlfile from the working directory. In Step 3, it reads afields.yamlfile. Data from these files, specifically theitem_related_infoandtopicfields, is interpolated into theprompttemplate for background agents. - Boundary markers: The constructed prompt uses standard Markdown headers (e.g.,
## Task,## Field Definitions) as delimiters. However, it lacks explicit "ignore embedded instructions" warnings or advanced boundary markers to prevent the sub-agent from accidentally or maliciously obeying commands hidden within the research outline content. - Capability inventory: The skill is granted extensive capabilities including
Bashfor shell execution,Writefor file persistence, andTaskfor launching additional autonomous agents. - Sanitization: While the output filename (
item_name_slug) is sanitized to remove special characters, the descriptive fields and research data are interpolated into the prompt without validation or escaping. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Python validation script using the
Bashtool. - Evidence: The prompt template in Step 3 requires the execution of
python ~/.claude/skills/research/validate_json.pyto verify the output. This pattern relies on a local script residing in the user's home directory.
Audit Metadata