session-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture relies on the agent reading and following instructions from Markdown documents stored in the
.claude/handoffs/directory. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions could be placed in these files to influence future agent behavior.\n - Ingestion points: The
RESUME WorkflowinSKILL.mdrequires the agent to read handoff documents completely. Thescripts/check_staleness.pyandscripts/validate_handoff.pyscripts also process these files as inputs.\n - Boundary markers: There are no technical boundaries, delimiters, or sanitization steps used to distinguish between legitimate context and potential malicious prompt injections within the handoff Markdown.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.run(primarily for git) and perform filesystem operations, which could be abused if an injected prompt tricks the agent into misusing these tools.\n - Sanitization: The skill provides a
scripts/validate_handoff.pyscript that proactively scans for secrets and TODOs to improve handoff safety and quality.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (scripts/create_handoff.py,scripts/check_staleness.py, andevals/setup_test_env.py) use thesubprocessmodule to executegitcommands. While currently restricted to git operations and using list-based arguments without a shell, this functionality provides a bridge to system command execution. Thescripts/create_handoff.pyscript includes a basic sanitization step for thesluginput to prevent simple injection or path traversal attempts.
Audit Metadata