microlink
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides detailed instructions for modifying agent and IDE configuration files to ensure the Microlink MCP server is loaded in future sessions. Specifically, it guides the modification of
claude_desktop_config.json,.vscode/mcp.json, and.cursor/mcp.jsonto add the@microlink/mcpserver. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to fetch and process arbitrary content from external URLs (via methods like
markdown,html, andtext). This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in third-party websites could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: External content is ingested through
microlink.markdown(),microlink.html(), and other scraping methods described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform network requests, execute code via the
functionmethod, and modify local configuration files. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of fetched web content is described within the skill body.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the
function(aliasrun) method and theevaluateextraction rule, which allow the agent to send and execute arbitrary JavaScript code within Microlink's remote browser sandbox. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes standard commands for installing and running the Microlink CLI and MCP server using
npm installandnpx, which are necessary for the skill's local execution capabilities.
Audit Metadata