make-ai-teammate
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly directs the agent to read secrets (e.g., agentBlueprintClientSecret / clientId / tenantId) from a365.generated.config.json and copy them into .env/appsettings (i.e., verbatim credential propagation / copy‑paste), which requires the LLM to handle secret values directly and risks exfiltration.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill deliberately adds workspace auto-approval rules and background task wiring that allow chat agents to run shell/CLI commands without interactive prompts, and it enables telemetry that captures sensitive prompts/responses and propagates blueprint secrets into env files — together these are intentional behaviors that create high-risk avenues for remote command execution and sensitive data exposure/exfiltration if misused.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill instructs runtime fetching/execution of remote code: it runs a git clone from https://github.com/microsoft/Agent365-Samples.git to scaffold sample code at runtime (which is later installed/run), and it includes a curl -sL https://aka.ms/DevTunnelCliInstall | bash install command for devtunnel that pipes a remote script to bash.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
E006
CRITICALMalicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
W012
MEDIUMUnverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Audit Metadata