product-council-here
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill distills a brief from potentially untrusted conversation history and user-provided arguments in SKILL.md. This distilled content is then passed to delegated sub-agents for review. If the source conversation contains malicious instructions, there is a risk they could be included in the brief and influence sub-agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Live conversation history and the
$ARGUMENTSparameter. - Boundary markers: The skill specifies
context_depth="none"for delegated agents to prevent them from accessing the broader chat history, and requires the creation of a "self-contained REVIEW BRIEF". - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
delegatetool to spawn sub-sessions and execute the review process. - Sanitization: The distillation phase acts as a curation step performed by the AI, though no programmatic filtering or sanitization of the input text is documented.
- Dynamic Dependency Loading: The skill dynamically loads and executes external sub-skills, such as
outcomistandintent-keeper, from local paths and vendor bundles (e.g.,microsoft/amplifier-bundle-skills). This behavior is a core part of the orchestrator's functionality but involves the execution of instructions sourced from external skill files at runtime.
Audit Metadata