batch-bug-shepherd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub issues and PRs (such as issue bodies and titles) which are then processed by various subagents during triage and fix phases. While this is necessary for the skill's intended purpose, it presents a potential surface where malicious instructions embedded in an issue could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion Points: Issue data enters via
gh issue listand is passed to subagents inassets/triage-prompt.mdandassets/fix-prompt.md. - Mitigation: The architecture employs 'Worktree isolation' to prevent cross-contamination, enforces 'ASCII-only' artifacts, and uses structured subagent prompts that explicitly limit capabilities (e.g., 'Do NOT modify the working tree' during triage).
- Sanitization: The skill specifies that cell writes to the ground-truth table must be sanitized ASCII summaries.
- [Command Execution via Developer Tools]: The skill utilizes standard command-line utilities such as
git,gh(GitHub CLI), anduv(Python toolchain) to manage the bug queue and perform fixes. These tools are used within a structured 'plan + execute + verify' framework to ensure deterministic outcomes. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/invariants.mddocument the usage ofgh issue list,git worktree, anduv run rufffor repository management and code quality enforcement. - [External Resource Integration]: The skill interacts with the vendor's host repository and utilizes well-known Python packages for testing and linting. These operations are consistent with the skill's role as a developer-oriented orchestrator.
- Evidence: References to
github.com/microsoft/apmand the use ofruffandpytestare integrated into the workflow as documented inassets/fix-prompt.mdandreferences/invariants.md.
Audit Metadata