cut-release
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Command Execution: The
verify-lint-mirror.shscript employsevalto run a sequence of hardcoded linting commands. While the use ofevalis generally noted for review, here it is restricted to a static list of well-known local tools such asruffandpylint, as well as local scripts likelint-auth-signals.sh. - Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill ingests data from external sources, specifically merged Pull Request titles and descriptions via the GitHub CLI (
gh pr view), to generate changelog entries. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the skill context through the
scripts/list-changes-since-tag.shscript, which fetches PR metadata. - Boundary markers: To mitigate the risk of embedded instructions in PR data influencing the agent, the skill utilizes a structured sanitizer (
assets/entry-sanitizer.md). This requires the agent to rephrase and summarize PR content into a strict, two-sentence format before inclusion in the changelog. - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to modify local repository files (
CHANGELOG.md,pyproject.toml) and perform network operations such asgit pushandgh pr createto the project's official repository. - Sanitization: The workflow enforces three mandatory human-review checkpoints: confirming the version bump rationale, reviewing the changelog diff, and addressing any linting failures before a PR is opened.
Audit Metadata