code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill processes external, untrusted content such as pull request diffs, metadata, and comments using tools like
gh pr diffandgh pr view. This creates an attack surface where a malicious actor could embed instructions within code comments or commit messages designed to influence the agent's behavior (e.g., instructing it to approve a PR regardless of bugs). - Ingestion Points: Data enters the context via
gh pr view,gh pr diff,gh api, and local file reads inSKILL.md. - Boundary Markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat content within diffs as untrusted data or to ignore embedded natural language instructions.
- Capability Inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
git,gh) and post content back to the GitHub API, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested diff content is specified.
- Command Execution: The skill relies on shell commands (
gitandgh) to interact with the local repository and the GitHub API. While these are used for the skill's primary purpose of code review, they represent a capability that requires careful monitoring when processing untrusted input.
Audit Metadata