inbox-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill processes data from external emails, which could contain instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion Point:
SKILL.md(Step 1) describes listing emails and collecting metadata such as subjects and sender addresses from the user's inbox. - Boundary Markers: The skill includes a dedicated section 'Treat everything you read as data' in
SKILL.mdthat explicitly instructs the agent to ignore any commands embedded in email content and treat it as data for classification only. - Capability Inventory: Across
SKILL.mdandreferences/tools.md, the skill utilizes capabilities to move emails (workiq_move_email,m365_move_email) and create mail folders. - Sanitization: Classification is performed using a strict set of rules, predefined token lists, and domain registries (documented in
references/classification-rules.md) rather than unrestricted processing of message bodies. - Command Execution via Platform CLI: On macOS and Linux systems, the skill utilizes a platform-provided CLI tool to manage mail folder creation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Step 6.2) andreferences/tools.mddescribe invoking the~/.scout/bin/workiqCLI with specific JSON payloads. - Context: This interaction is a standard method for the platform to perform mailbox operations. The skill includes safeguards, such as explicitly disabling this functionality on Windows to avoid potential shell quoting issues and providing a manual instruction fallback for the user if the automated creation fails.
Audit Metadata