architecture-diagrams
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Secure Input Processing]: The skill processes external infrastructure and catalog files through a security-hardened Python script (
scripts/render_catalog_erd.py). This script implements multiple layers of protection to handle untrusted data safely. - Ingestion points: The agent reads user-supplied Terraform, Bicep, ARM, and
DS_CATALOG_V1markdown files to extract relationship data. - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mddefines clear success criteria and stop rules that prevent the agent from guessing or inferring relationships outside the confirmed source scope. - Capability inventory: The skill is limited to local file reading and executing a specific, well-defined rendering script; it does not perform arbitrary shell execution or network operations.
- Sanitization: The renderer enforces strict limits on display text (maximum 120 characters) and utilizes a character blacklist (
<,>,{,},", etc.) to prevent markup injection or diagram syntax manipulation in the generated Mermaid or ASCII output. - [Path Traversal Protection]: File handling logic in the rendering script includes explicit checks for
..segments and ensures that all resolved paths remain within authorized directory roots before any read operations occur. - [Safe YAML Parsing]: The catalog parser uses a custom loader inherited from
yaml.SafeLoaderthat is further hardened to reject dangerous YAML features such as aliases, anchors, merge keys, and explicit tags, effectively mitigating risks of logic bypass or denial-of-service through YAML structure. - [Resource Constrainment]: A hard limit of 5MB is enforced on input files (
MAX_INPUT_BYTES), providing a safeguard against resource exhaustion attacks when parsing large or malformed infrastructure configuration files.
Audit Metadata