demo-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Remote Code Execution Considerations]: The shell and PowerShell wrappers (
scripts/assemble-video.shandscripts/Invoke-AssembleVideo.ps1) check for the presence of the 'uv' package manager. If not found, they provide or suggest the use of an installation command (curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh). While downloading and piping scripts to a shell is a sensitive operation, this specific pattern targets the official installer for a well-known and widely used developer tool. - [Command Execution via Subprocess]: The core logic in
scripts/assemble_video.pyusessubprocess.runto invoke theffmpegandffprobecommand-line tools. These calls are implemented using list-based arguments rather than shell strings (e.g.,subprocess.run(command, ...)wherecommandis a list), which is a recommended security practice to prevent command injection. The skill resolves and validates file paths before passing them to these tools. - [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill processes external data via a YAML manifest (
segments.yml). An attacker who can control the content of this manifest could potentially influence the parameters passed to FFmpeg. However, the skill implements strict schema validation and file existence checks inassemble_video.pyto mitigate risks associated with untrusted input.
Audit Metadata