assemble-ppmplugin
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Command Execution via Shell]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute thejarutility, which is necessary for assembling the plugin bundle. - Evidence: Step 4.1 uses shell commands to navigate to the staging directory and execute
jar cMfto create the final archive. - Security Consideration: Executing shell commands using variables (such as the plugin name) sourced from an external
manifest.jsonfile creates a potential path for command injection if the input is not strictly validated. - [Processing External Configuration]: The skill ingests and reconciles data from a JSON configuration file.
- Evidence: Step 2.1 reads
ppmplugin/staging/manifest.jsonto determine the output filename and which binaries to include in the bundle. - Security Consideration: This represents an indirect prompt injection surface. A maliciously crafted manifest could attempt to influence the agent's logic or exploit the command execution path described above, especially if the file is provided by an untrusted third party.
- [User Confirmation Checkpoints]: The skill includes interactive prompts before performing potentially destructive or ambiguous actions.
- Evidence: Step 2.5 uses
AskUserQuestionto handle platform mismatches, and Step 4 uses it to prevent silent overwriting of existing bundles. - Context: These checkpoints are positive safety features that provide user oversight and reduce the risk of accidental data loss or incorrect builds.
Audit Metadata