semantic-model-authoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill is designed to ingest and process semantic model metadata, such as table descriptions, measure names, and DAX code, which are external to the agent's instructions. This presents an inherent surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions could be embedded within these model properties.
- Ingestion points: Fabric semantic model metadata (tables, measures, descriptions) and lakehouse schema definitions accessed via
az restand MCP tools. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write local files (TMDL scaffolding), perform network operations (via
az rest), and modify live models in the Fabric service. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" markers are defined for the metadata content being processed.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or validation routines for external metadata strings before they are interpolated into the agent's context.
- [External Dependency Management]: The skill depends on the
@microsoft/powerbi-modeling-mcppackage, which is fetched and executed vianpxat runtime. This package originates from a trusted organization (Microsoft) and is a standard component for the skill's modeling functionality. - [Command Execution via CLI]: The skill frequently uses
az restto interact with Microsoft Fabric and Power BI APIs. These commands are used within the intended scope of managing workspace items, model definitions, and connection bindings.
Audit Metadata