agentic-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill is configured to load and prioritize instructions from
.github/aw/instructions.mdif the file exists within the local repository. This represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection, as content within the repository can influence the agent's behavior for any user invoking the skill in that context. - External Resource Retrieval: The skill fetches extensive workflow logic, templates, and instruction sets from an external repository (github/gh-aw). This is a core part of its design as a central dispatcher for workflow management across different task types.
- Command Execution Best Practices: The included documentation in
references/runtime-contracts.mdprovides detailed security guidance, specifically advising against the interpolation of event data directly into shell scripts. It recommends using environment variables and quoting values to mitigate potential command injection risks. - Credential and Privilege Management: The skill emphasizes maintaining strict security boundaries between execution phases (e.g., trusted pre-agent work vs. agent sandbox). It cautions against widening token permissions or exporting write-privileged credentials into the sandbox environment, advocating for the principle of least privilege.
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