azure-personalizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch documentation from
learn.microsoft.comusing tools likefetch_webpage. Processing external, untrusted content (even from trusted domains) and incorporating it into the agent's context creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the web content could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Content retrieved via
mcp_microsoftdocs:microsoft_docs_fetchandfetch_webpageas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined to delimit fetched content or warn the agent about potential instructions within the data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities for network access and local file reading (
read_file). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the fetched Markdown content is specified in the skill instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation from
learn.microsoft.comand directs users to the officialMicrosoftDocsGitHub repository for tool installation. These operations target well-known and established service providers.
Audit Metadata