figcraft
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external design files which could contain malicious prompts meant to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Import modules for SVG, Figma (.fig), and REST API JSON described in
SKILL.mdandevidence.md. - Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions for the agent to disregard text found within design assets.
- Capability inventory: High. Includes the ability to execute headless scripts and modify document state via
figcraft-cli. - Sanitization: Structural validation and repair are mentioned, but text content is not filtered for prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands for design tasks.
- Evidence: Use of
figcraft-clisubcommands likerun,export, andconvertis documented throughoutSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Live collaboration and plugin publishing require connecting to remote servers.
- Evidence: Mentions of
figcraft-serverandwss://protocols inreferences/automation-surfaces.md. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The tool supports a plugin architecture that runs WebAssembly code at runtime.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddescribes a sandboxed WebAssembly environment using thewasmiinterpreter for plugins.
Audit Metadata