skills/middleapi/orpc/orpc-migrate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

orpc-migrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch external documentation from orpc.dev (e.g., https://orpc.dev/llms-full.txt) and explicitly tells the agent to trust the fetched pages over its own internal instructions or memory. This creates a vulnerability where instructions embedded in external content could override agent behavior during the migration process.
  • Ingestion points: Defined in SKILL.md, including https://orpc.dev/llms.txt, https://orpc.dev/llms-full.txt, and various documentation slugs.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially embedded instructions in the documentation.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is expected to use standard file system operations for code migration and shell commands for dependency management.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering is specified for the content retrieved from the external URLs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains instructions to execute shell commands to manage the migration environment.
  • Evidence: Instructions to run npm install for various @orpc/* packages and npm view @orpc/server dist-tags to determine the latest version of the software.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external domains to obtain documentation and software packages.
  • Evidence: References to orpc.dev, v1.orpc.dev, and the NPM registry for package updates.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 2, 2026, 07:22 PM