orpc-migrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch external documentation from
orpc.dev(e.g.,https://orpc.dev/llms-full.txt) and explicitly tells the agent to trust the fetched pages over its own internal instructions or memory. This creates a vulnerability where instructions embedded in external content could override agent behavior during the migration process. - Ingestion points: Defined in
SKILL.md, includinghttps://orpc.dev/llms.txt,https://orpc.dev/llms-full.txt, and various documentation slugs. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially embedded instructions in the documentation.
- Capability inventory: The agent is expected to use standard file system operations for code migration and shell commands for dependency management.
- Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering is specified for the content retrieved from the external URLs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains instructions to execute shell commands to manage the migration environment.
- Evidence: Instructions to run
npm installfor various@orpc/*packages andnpm view @orpc/server dist-tagsto determine the latest version of the software. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external domains to obtain documentation and software packages.
- Evidence: References to
orpc.dev,v1.orpc.dev, and the NPM registry for package updates.
Audit Metadata